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Smoking prevalence has declined in the past
few decades, but recently, progress has
stalled.1,2 In 1997, nearly 1 in 4 adults, and
more than 1 in 3 youths, smoked at least 1
cigarette in the previous month. Although by
2007 rates for both groups had dropped to
about 20%, no declines have been observed
since.2,3 Without further progress, Healthy
People 2020 goals for smoking among adults
(12%) and youths (16%) will not be met.4
Cigarette excise taxes are considered one
of the most effective strategies for reducing
smoking.5,6 Higher cigarette prices are asso-
ciated with decreased consumption,7---9 and
taxes are an effective tool for raising product
price.10 Furthermore, in almost half of all states,
some portion of excise tax revenues fund
tobacco control programs.11
Although all states levy cigarette taxes,
rates vary extensively.12 In 2011, New York’s
$4.35 tax rate was more than 25 times higher
than Missouri’s $0.17 rate.13 Geographic vari-
ation in taxes may promote regional dispari-
ties in smoking prevalence and encourage
cross-border smuggling or online tobacco sales,
limiting the public health impact and revenue
generation capabilities of high taxes.13---15 In
2007, the Institute of Medicine recommended
that states with excise taxes below those in
the top quintile raise their rates to match those
in high-tax states.6
Yet raising cigarette taxes, especially in low-
tax states, has proven difficult. Between 2007
and 2011, only 43% of states in the bottom
4 quintiles raised taxes, whereas 91% of the
highest-tax states increased their rates.12 Little
is known about what motivates recent changes
in state excise tax levels. Tobacco control
advocates have suggested that economic con-
tractions may drive states to raise cigarette
taxes to generate revenue, noting high numbers
of tax hikes following national recessions.16
Political scientists, however, argue that
political factors and regional pressures may
also be important policy predictors.17---19
Nonelection years and neighboring tax initia-
tives, in addition to poor fiscal health, have
been associated with diffusion of gasoline and
income taxes.18 Public support of tobacco
control, as well as actions of local and neigh-
boring governments, influence the uptake of
indoor air and tobacco sales restriction poli-
cies.20,21 The extent to which economic cir-
cumstances, state politics, constituency beliefs,
or regional pressures influence state cigarette
excise tax rates, however, remains unclear.
Moreover, the key determinants of cigarette
taxes can change over time, as public opinion
evolves. The 1998 Master Settlement Agree-
ment (MSA) with tobacco manufacturers gen-
erated new allocations of tobacco control revenue,
some of which was used to fund social mar-
keting campaigns about smoking and the to-
bacco industry (e.g., the “truth” campaign). One
study did document some economic and polit-
ical correlates of state cigarette tax rates, but
relied on data through 2000, just as the impact
of the MSA began.22 In the years since the
MSA, the public has increasingly identified
smoking as hazardous, and the majority now
supports some form of tobacco control legisla-
tion.23 If these public sentiments influence
beliefs about cigarette taxes, the political land-
scape in which tax decisions are made could
be changing.
Better understanding of which factors most
strongly predict cigarette taxes could help
tobacco control professionals target their ad-
vocacy. We used annual data from all 50 states
between 1981 and 2011 to explore the mag-
nitude of the associations between key eco-
nomic, political, and regional characteristics
and state cigarette excise tax levels, both before
and after the MSA.
METHODS
We compiled cigarette excise tax rates for all
50 states and the District of Columbia from
1981 to 2011, creating a data set of 1581
observations. We matched each state---year
tax rate with select economic, political, attitu-
dinal, and demographic characteristics from
the previous year, to account for the lag be-
tween a tax policy vote and implementation.
Objectives. We evaluated state-level characteristics associated with cigarette
excise taxes before and after the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).
Methods. We gathered annual cigarette excise tax rates for all US states and
the District of Columbia, between 1981 and 2011, and matched each state–year
tax rate with economic, political, attitudinal, and demographic characteristics,
creating a data set of 1581 observations. We used panel data regression tech-
niques to assess relationships between key characteristics and state cigarette
excise tax levels.
Results. Cigarette excise tax rates grew at more than 6 times the rate of
inflation between 1981 and 2011; growth varied by time period and region. We
found strong negative associations between Republican Party control of state
legislatures and governors’ offices and state cigarette tax rates. Tobacco pro-
duction, citizens’ attitudes toward taxes and tobacco control, and cigarette tax
rates in neighboring states were significantly associated with cigarette tax rates.
We found no association between unemployment and tax rates.
Conclusions. Future excise tax growth rate may depend more on the political
leanings of state legislators, and the attitudes of the people they represent, than
on economic circumstances. (AmJ Public Health. 2014;104:350–357. doi:10.2105/
AJPH.2013.301537)
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Measures
State cigarette taxes. We drew state cigarette
excise taxes from the 2011 edition of The
Tax Burden on Tobacco, which is produced by
the consulting firm Orzechowski and Walker
with support from cigarette manufacturers and
state tobacco tax administrators.12 Taxes are
measured in cents per pack of 20 cigarettes.
In regression analyses, rates are adjusted for
inflation with the consumer price index, and
logged to decrease skewness.
State economic conditions. We employed 2
annual measures of state economic conditions.
The state unemployment rate, calculated by
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, is the
percentage of people in the labor force who are
unemployed.24 State per capita income is cal-
culated by dividing the total personal income of
all residents by the midyear population with
data from the US Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis.25 In sensitivity analyses, we used Census
measures of outstanding state debt,26 Bureau
of Labor Statistics measures of national un-
employment,27 and indicators for the 7 years
of national recession, as defined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.28
We included a dichotomous indicator of
whether a state is an agricultural producer of
tobacco, based on whether the US Department
of Agriculture reported that state farmers
grew a nonzero number of tobacco acres in any
year in the analysis period.29 Data describing
the number of farmed tobacco acres were
also used in sensitivity analyses.
State political conditions. We included 2
annual measures of political climate: guberna-
torial election and party control. The guber-
natorial election variable indicates whether
an election occurred in a specific year (= 1)
or not (= 0). Party control is a categorical
variable with 3 possible values: Democratic
control, which occurs when the governor is
a Democrat and Democrats hold majorities in
both state legislative bodies; Republican con-
trol if Republicans hold the governorship and
majorities in both legislative bodies; and mixed
control. We compiled political information
from The Book of the States, produced by
the Council of State Governments.30 In sensi-
tivity analyses, we considered measures of
average citizen and government ideology, on
a liberal---conservative continuum, developed
by Berry et al.31,32
Attitudes about taxes and tobacco control. To
capture opinions about taxes in general, we used
data from 19 waves of the General Social Survey
administered between 1980 and 2009.33 Re-
spondents were asked whether they believed
federal income taxes were too high, about right,
or too low. Few respondents (< 5%) indicated
that taxes were too low, so our variable measures
the percentage of respondents concerned that
taxes were too high. Responses were aggregated
by 9 Census-defined regional divisions. Because
the General Social Survey is administered
every other year, we interpolated values in
alternate years by averaging percentages from
the previous and subsequent years.
We derived 2 variables describing public
attitudes toward tobacco control from 7 itera-
tions of the Current Population Survey Tobacco
Use Supplement that were administered be-
tween 1992 and 2007.34 Support for restaurant
smoking bans was measured as the percentage
of state respondents who agreed that smok-
ing in restaurants should be not allowed at all,
as opposed to allowed in some or all areas.
Home smoking bans were measured as the
percentage of respondents who indicated that
smoking was not permitted in their home.
External conditions. To assess regional pres-
sures on cigarette taxation, we used Tax Burden
on Tobacco12 data to create annual measures
of the average tax level in contiguous states.
We also included a dichotomous variable to
indicate the 6 years in which federal excise
taxes on cigarettes were raised. Finally, we
included 4 categorical variables indicating
the geographic region of the state, as defined
by the US Census Bureau.35
State demographic controls. We included
measures of population size and composition to
control for fiscal pressures from population
growth, and differences in cigarette demand
resulting from disparities in tobacco use.2 We
drew annual sociodemographic state charac-
teristics from the US Census36 and the Current
Population Survey,37 and employed these as
control variables. We measured population growth
as the annual percentage increase in population
size from the previous year. We measured
racial, ethnic, age, and educational variations
by the percentage of the population identifying
as non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic of any race,
younger than 18 years, older than 64 years,
and older than 25 years with a college degree.
Analysis
After we examined changes in the prevalence
and magnitude of cigarette excise rate changes,
we estimated bivariate analyses of differences
in tax rates under varying state conditions,
and multivariate analyses that isolate effects
of economic, political, and regional factors.
Our multivariate linear regression models em-
ployed random effects to account for clustering
of data within states (Breusch---Pagan test v2 =
7174.7; P< .01), with first-order autoregressive
disturbances to adjust for additional serial cor-
relation in the observation-specific error term
(Baltagi---Li joint test v2 = 1197.9; P< .01).
Because cigarette taxes have increased
across all years and regions, we included a
linear time trend in all models, but also created
a spline to allow the time trend to differ before
and after the MSA adoption in November
1988, and conducted stratified analyses in
the 2 time periods. To account for the lag be-
tween MSA adoption and the implementation
of new excise tax policies, we divided the time
periods after 1999. Finally, we estimated an
additional model, incorporating measures of
attitudes toward tobacco control between
1992 and 2008.
To ensure that our results were not sensitive
to variations in model structure or construct
measurement, we conducted analyses in which
we added additional variables describing po-
litical ideology, outstanding state debt, and
acres of farmed tobacco, or substituted alter-
native employment measures for state unem-
ployment. We also estimated state and year
fixed-effects models to explore potential bias in
coefficient estimates caused by unobserved
factors. In the absence of evidence for signifi-
cant bias, we prefer the random effects, time
trend model, because it explicitly includes geo-
graphic region, tobacco grower status, and
federal tax hikes.
We conducted all analyses with panel
data estimation packages in Stata version 11
(StataCorp LP, College Station, TX).
RESULTS
Between 1981 and 2011, average nominal
rates of cigarette excise taxes increased from
$0.13 to $1.38, an increase nearly 6 times the
rate of inflation, with rates growing more
quickly following the MSA (Figure 1). Although
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regional variation was limited in 1981, by
2011, the average excise tax rate in the
Northeast ($2.70 per pack) was 3 times higher
than the average rate in the South ($0.91), and
taxes in non---tobacco-growing states ($1.58)
were 1.5 times higher than those in tobacco-
growing states ($1.08). Differences in average
tax rates by region and tobacco-growing status
were statistically significant in t test compari-
sons, both before and after the MSA (Table 1).
Variation in Cigarette Excise Tax Rates
In bivariate t test comparisons of average
values, state cigarette excise taxes varied
significantly under select state conditions, as
a result of differences in both the number
and magnitude of cigarette tax hikes (Table 1).
Although average taxes did not vary across
states with high versus low unemployment rates
across the full time period, stratified analyses
indicated that tax rates were lower in high-
unemployment states before the MSA, but higher
in high-unemployment states following it. This
shift appears to reflect higher tax hikes when
they occurred, rather than a greater prevalence
of hikes. In all time periods, higher-income and
non---tobacco-growing states passed more, and
larger, tax hikes, compared with lower-income
and non---tobacco-growing states, resulting in
significantly higher average rates.
Significant differences in average tax rates
by party control exist only following the
MSA, when average Democratic-controlled
state rates were 1.7 times higher than those in
Republican-controlled states (Table 1). This
difference appears to be attributable to more,
rather than larger, tax hikes. Cigarette tax rates
were lower in regions where a larger per-
centage of people believed that federal income
taxes were too high, and in states that
border relatively low-tax areas.
Correlates of State Cigarette Excise
Rates Across All Years
Comparing mean tax rates can reveal pat-
terns, but does not account for potential con-
founding from correlations between predictors
of tax rates. To identify the independent effects
of various state characteristics on cigarette
tax rates, we analyzed multivariate regression
models.
The only economic factor significantly related
to tax rates during the complete time period
was tobacco-growing status (Table 2, model 1).
Non---tobacco-growing states had 41% higher
excise tax rates, compared with tobacco-
growing states, with other factors held constant
from 1981 to 2011.
Across all years, Republican Party control
was associated with 6% lower rates, com-
pared with mixed-party control, whereas
Democratic control and gubernatorial election
year were unrelated to cigarette tax rates
(model 1). Regional beliefs about federal in-
come taxes demonstrated a slight positive
association with cigarette taxes, such that
a 1-percentage-point increase in the percent-
age of people believing income taxes are too
high was associated with a 0.3% increase in
excise tax rates.
Federal and regional cigarette tax rates
were also correlated with state rates between
1981 and 2011. Model 1 indicates that when
average taxes in neighboring states doubled,
taxes in the referent state increased by an
average of 21%. In the year following a federal
tax hike, state taxes increased an average of
2.6%, with other factors held constant.
Finally, significant differences in regional
tax rates and changes over time remained in
our multivariate models, as shown in model 1.
Under similar economic, political, and social
conditions, states in the Northeast and Midwest
would have tax rates 67% and 34% higher
than those in the South, respectively. Before
the MSA, cigarette tax rates grew an average



































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 1—Regional variation in nominal state tobacco excise taxes over time by (a) region
and (b) tobacco grower status: all US states and the District of Columbia, 1981–2011.
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































February 2014, Vol 104, No. 2 | American Journal of Public Health Golden et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | 353
marginally significant (P= .05); after the MSA,
the annual growth rate increased to 7%, with
all other factors held constant.
Differences in Excise Tax Correlates
Over Time
To document changes in the correlates of
excise tax rates before and after the MSA, we
stratified the results by time period (Table 2,
models 2 and 3). Consistent with Figure 1,
variation in taxes by tobacco-growing state,
as well as region, was strongest after the MSA.
In addition, per capita income was significantly
and positively associated with taxes in the
early time period (b = 0.03), but showed no
impact in the later time period.
Stratified results also demonstrate that, be-
fore the MSA, control by the Democratic
Party was associated with a 4% increase in
excise tax rates, whereas Republican control
had no impact. After the MSA, however,
Democratic control became an insignificant
factor, and tax rates under Republican control
were 17% lower than those under mixed-
party control. Whereas neighboring states’
tax rates appeared to consistently have an
impact on referent state rates in both time
periods, federal tax hikes appeared to
be stronger correlates following the MSA
(b = 0.06).
In unadjusted models, we found correlations
between positive attitudes toward bans on
smoking at home and in restaurants and higher
excise taxes, but only the influence of home
smoking bans remained significant once we
adjusted for economic, political, and social
factors (Table 3). A 1-percentage-point in-
crease in nonsmokers living in homes with
smoking bans was associated with a 1.4%
increase in excise taxes. In this model, the
effects of other covariates (not shown)
remained similar to what is reported in Table 1,
model 1, except our measure of regional
attitudes toward income taxes became insig-
nificant.
Including different measures of political
sentiment or economic indicators, adding
variables capturing tobacco production, or
employing alternative model specifications
did not change the magnitude or significance
of most effects (results not shown). Increased
tobacco production was associated with a small
(< 1%) decrease in excise tax rates, whereas
measures of political ideology, national
TABLE 2—State Economic, Political, and Attitudinal Factors Associated With State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates (Logged; n = 1581):
All US States and the District of Columbia, 1981–2011
Factor Mean
Model 1: All Years
(n = 1581), b (95% CI)
Model 2: Pre-MSA (1981–1999;
n = 969), b (95% CI)
Model 3: Post-MSA (2000–2011;
n = 612), b (95% CI)
State economic characteristics
Unemployment rate 5.98 0.002 (–0.01, 0.02) 0.010 (0.00, 0.02) –0.010 (–0.04, 0.02)
Per capita income, in thousands 33.00 0.011 (0.00, 0.03) 0.025** (0.01, 0.04) 0.006 (-0.02, 0.03)
Non–tobacco-growing state 0.65 0.411** (0.14, 0.68) 0.347* (0.08, 0.62) 0.526** (0.21, 0.84)
State political characteristics
Government party control
Democratic 0.29 0.034 (–0.01, 0.08) 0.041* (0.00, 0.08) 0.039 (–0.06, 0.14)
Republican 0.16 -0.064* (–0.12, –0.01) 0.021 (–0.04, 0.08) –0.170** (–0.29, –0.05)
Mixed control 0.55 . . . . . . . . .
Governor election year 0.27 0.002 (–0.02, 0.02) 0.009 (–0.01, 0.03) –0.028 (–0.07, 0.01)
Attitudes toward federal income taxes
Percentage believe taxes too high 61.49 0.003* (0.00, 0.01) 0.002 (0.00, 0.00) 0.005 (0.00, 0.01)
Percentage believe taxes right or too low 38.51 . . . . . . . . .
External factors
Average border state tax, log 2.87 0.207** (0.12, 0.30) 0.180** (0.07, 0.29) 0.185* (0.03, 0.34)
Federal excise hike 0.19 0.026* (0.00, 0.05) 0.008 (–0.02, 0.03) 0.059* (0.01, 0.11)
Census regions
Northeast 0.18 0.669** (0.31, 1.03) 0.503** (0.15, 0.86) 0.964** (0.49, 1.44)
Midwest 0.24 0.340* (0.02, 0.66) 0.260 (–0.06, 0.58) 0.479* (0.08, 0.88)
South 0.33 . . . . . . . . .
West 0.25 0.281 (–0.09, 0.65) 0.104 (–0.26, 0.47) 0.550* (0.07, 1.03)
Time trends
Linear trend 1980–1999 . . . 0.011 (0.00, 0.02) 0.008 (0.00, 0.02) . . .
Linear trend 2000–2010 . . . 0.067** (0.05, 0.08) . . . 0.078** (0.05, 0.10)
Note. CI = confidence interval; MSA = Master Settlement Agreement. All regressors lagged 1 year. Excise tax rates and per capita income are both adjusted for inflation. Excise taxes are measured in
logged 2010 cents. All models include variables controlling for changes in state demographic conditions, and were estimated with state random effects to adjust for clustering within states, and for
first-order autocorrelation.
*P < .05; **P < .01.
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unemployment, or indicators of recession,
when added or substituted in the original
model, showed no effect. Finally, coefficients
on the regressors of interest did not change in
significance or magnitude when we employed
state or year fixed effects.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with the growth of other tobacco
control initiatives,1,6 state cigarette tax rates
have, on average, increased over time, with
stronger growth following the 1998 MSA.
Moreover, variation in excise tax rates has also
increased over time. Consistent with earlier
findings,22 states where tobacco is farmed
continue to lag behind the rest of the country
in adopting higher cigarette tax rates. Models
that control for economic, political, and other
factors suggest that non---tobacco-producing
states levy tax rates that are more than 40%
higher than those in tobacco-producing states.
Furthermore, even when tobacco production
is taken into account, states in the Northeast,
and more recently the Midwest and West, are
establishing higher rates than Southern states.
Our results suggest this may be attributable
to both greater likelihood of tax hikes in certain
areas and higher rate increases when hikes
are adopted.
Whereas some advocates and media pundits
have argued that economic downturns may
trigger tax hikes designed to fill budget short-
falls,16 our results suggest otherwise. Although
our results and an earlier study22 indicate
associations between higher per capita income
levels and cigarette taxes before the MSA, we
found no such associations in the post-MSA
era. Furthermore, although taxes do appear
to be higher when state unemployment is
high, particularly in recent years, this rela-
tionship appears to be confounded by other
factors. Once politics, attitudes, and regional
variation are considered, relationships between
state unemployment rates and cigarette taxes
disappear.
Instead, our results imply that changing
distributions of political power may be more
important than macroeconomic changes for
understanding excise tax rates. Policy change is
typically easier when the same party controls
both legislative and executive bodies. The
significant effects associated with political con-
trol in some of the models, therefore, may be
unsurprising. More notable are the changes
in those impacts over time. Before the MSA,
Democratic control resulted in higher excise
taxes, and Republican control had little impact.
Since 2000, however, Democratic control is
no longer associated with high tax rates, whereas
Republican control is now associated with
17% lower cigarette tax rates, compared with
mixed-control states. Our descriptive data
suggest that this is largely because of fewer,
rather than smaller, tax increases under Re-
publican control. The 2012 election resulted
in the largest number of unified governments
since 1952, with 23 under Republican control.38
In these states, it seems likely that Republican
leadership will continue to hinder efforts to
raise cigarette tax rates.
Despite this challenge, our results can pro-
vide direction to tobacco control professionals
trying to promote higher state cigarette tax
rates. Targeting advocacy efforts in states that
are struggling economically may be ineffective
if political barriers to tobacco control exist.
In the absence of strong political opposition, our
analyses suggest that states that border others
where excise taxes have recently risen are ideal
targets for rate adjustment. Consumers likely
cross state borders in pursuit of lower tobacco
tax rates.39,40 As a consequence, politicians
may be most amenable to raising cigarette taxes
when the potential for losing revenue because
of a hike is minimized. Furthermore, positive
associations between higher taxes in neigh-
boring and referent states imply a reciprocal
pattern of regional taxation. If one state,
especially near a low tax region, makes a sub-
stantial policy change, its neighbors may fol-
low suit.
Tobacco control advocates might also benefit
from distinguishing cigarette taxes from other
taxes in their campaigns. In our analyses, higher
cigarette taxes were positively correlated
with both regional concerns about high federal
taxes and state-level support for other tobacco
restrictions, especially home smoking bans.
Despite opposition to higher income tax rates
generally, the American public may favor higher
tax rates on harmful products, such as ciga-
rettes, more specifically. As public support for
tobacco control continues to grow,23 public
health officials may become better situated to
work with politicians to raise cigarette taxes
and promote reductions in tobacco consumption.
Our analysis provides the first nationwide
evaluation of state-level characteristics asso-
ciated with cigarette excise tax rates in the
post-MSA era, but we faced some limitations.
We could not evaluate the effects of lobbying
activities on tax rates, because longitudinal
data describing state political activities by both
the tobacco industry and tobacco control ad-
vocates are not available. Research about the
importance of such activities to excise taxes
is contested, with some authors documenting
comprehensive strategies by the tobacco in-
dustry to defeat a variety of policies,41,42 and
others arguing that effects demonstrated in
previous analyses were confounded.43 In 2012,
the tobacco industry spent more than $45
million dollars to fight a proposal to raise excise
taxes by a dollar in California, and tobacco
control advocates credit these expenditures
with the initiative’s defeat.44 One recent study
suggested that tobacco lobbying currently
targets only a small number of initiatives, but
TABLE 3—Association of Tobacco Taxes With Tobacco Control Attitudes: All US States and
the District of Columbia, 1993–2008
Model Mean Unadjusted, b (95% CI) Adjusted,a b (95% CI)
1: Percentage of homes with smoking bans (n = 561) 60.62 0.021** (0.02, 0.02) 0.014* (0.00, 0.03)
2: Percentage supporting full restaurant smoking ban (n = 510) 52.44 0.025** (0.02, 0.03) –0.156 (–1.01, 0.70)
Note. CI = confidence interval. Data for model 1 drawn from all states in the years 1992–1993, 1995–1996, 1998–1999, 2001–
2002, 2003, and 2006–2007. Because of data availability, model 2 excludes the year 2003. All regressors were lagged 1 year.
aModels include variables controlling for unemployment rate, per capita income, tobacco-growing status, government party
control, gubernatorial election status, attitudes toward federal income taxes, federal or border taxes, census region, state
demographic conditions, and time trends, and were estimated with state random effects and for first-order autocorrelation.
*P < .05; **P < .01.
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
February 2014, Vol 104, No. 2 | American Journal of Public Health Golden et al. | Peer Reviewed | Research and Practice | 355
usually defeats a large portion of those it
targets.45 Without uniform data on spending
by advocates supporting and fighting tax in-
creases, however, the average role of interest
groups in excise tax policies is unknown.
State cigarette excise taxes remain one of the
most promising strategies for reducing cigarette
use and preventing smoking-related illness
and death, yet implementing them requires
policy change. Although cigarette taxes have
increased over time, there is disparity in tax
rates across states, with tobacco-growing and
Southern states lagging behind the rest of
the country. Despite suggestions that reces-
sionary periods spark higher cigarette taxes, the
speed of excise tax growth in the future may
depend more on the political leanings of state
legislators, and the attitudes of the people
they represent, than on the economic circum-
stances they face. j
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